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Finneran: The Death of the Ensuing Physical Injury Rule: Validating Claims

NOTES

THE DEATH OF THE ENSUING PHYSICAL INJURY

RULE: VALIDATING CLAIMS FOR NEGLIGENT
INFLICTION OF EMOTIONAL HARM
Legal history shows that artificial islands of exceptions, created

from the fear that the legal process will not work, usually do not
withstand the waves of reality and, in time, descend into oblivion.'
Why the distinction? My mental anguish is the same accompanied
or unaccompanied by physical manifestation. If as a result of
someone's negligent conduct, I suffer the horrors of gut-wrenching,
sleepless nights worrying about the well being of myself, my wife
and my children, I should be allowed to recover without having to
dream up some foundationalphysical ailment. If I throw up as a
result of my emotional distress, I can recover. However, if I am
blessed with a strong stomach, then no matter how acute my

mental anguish may be, I cannot recover. This distinction is not
only gossamer, it is whimsical.2

The law has come a long way towards protecting an individual's
interest in emotional tranquility. While that interest is now broadly
protected from intentional invasions, no duty to avoid negligent inflictions has yet been generally recognized. The major remaining obstacle to recovery for the negligent infliction of emotional harm is
the requirement that such harm blossom into physical injury-what
will be referred to as the "ensuing physical injury rule." 3 Although
1. Dillon v. Legg, 68 Cal. 2d 728, 747, 441 P.2d 912, 925, 69 Cal. Rptr. 72, 85 (1968).
2. Allen v. Jones, 104 Cal. App. 3d 207, 216-17, 163 Cal. Rptr. 445, 451 (Ct. App.
1980) (Gardner, J., concurring).
3. I have chosen this term merely to simplify the inquiry at hand. The language employed by courts to refer to emotional harm or mental distress and its consequences presents
problems of comprehension, both of what the facts of decided cases were and what law was
applied. For example, there is disagreement on what a physical injury consists of, even among
members of the same court: In Sinn v. Burd, 486 Pa. 146, 404 A.2d 672 (1979), plaintiff
alleged "severe depression" and "an acute nervous condition" resulting from her observation of
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only a few cases explicitly hold that ensuing physical injury is a nec-

essary component of a claim for the negligent infliction of emotional
harm," it is evident that many states5 and the Restatement' retain
defendant negligently running down and killing her child with his automobile. The majority
characterized her complaint as one for "physical and mental injuries," id. at 146, 404 A.2d at
673, while the dissent stated that "the complaint reveals only a claim for emotional injuries,"
Id. at 176, 404 A.2d at 687 (Roberts, J., dissenting) (citing RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS
§ 436A, Comment c (1965)). Comment c of the Restatement, however, does not clear up the
confusion:
The rule stated in this Section applies to all forms of emotional disturbance, including temporary fright, nervous shock, nausea, grief, rage, and humiliation. The fact
that these are accompanied by transitory, npn-recurring physical phenomena, harmless in themselves, such as dizziness, vomiting, and the like, does not make the actor
liable where such phenomena are in themselves inconsequential and do not amount
to any substantial bodily harm. On the other hand, long continued nausea or headaches may amount to physical illness, which is bodily harm; and even long continued mental disturbance, as for example in the case of repeated hysterical attacks, or
mental aberration, may be classified by the courts as illness, notwithstanding their
mental character. This becomes a medical or psychiatric problem, rather than one
of law.
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 436A, Comment c (1965).
Rhode Island requires that emotional harm be "accompanied by physical symptoms."
D'Ambra v. United States, 114 R.I. 643, 657, 338 A.2d 524, 531 (1975). Washington requires
that emotional harm be "manifested by objective symptomatology." Hunsley v. Giard, 87
Wash. 2d 424, 436, 553 P.2d 1096, 1103 (1976). Michigan requires that the emotional harm
result in a "definite and objective physical injury," yet finds that condition to exist where
plaintiff has "withdrawn from normal forms of socialization," is "unable to function as she did
previously" and continues "in a state of depression." Toms v. McConnell, 45 Mich. App. 647,
657, 207 N.W.2d 140, 145 (Ct. App. 1973).
Maryland has stubbornly refused to overrule its ensuing physical injury rule but has perhaps achieved the same result by redefinition: "Proof of a 'physical injury' is also permitted by
evidence indicative of a 'mental state.' . . . [T]he term 'physical' is not used in its ordinary
dictionary sense. Instead, it is used to represent that the injury for which recovery is sought is
capable of objective determination." Vance v. Vance, 286 Md. 490, 500, 408 A.2d 728, 733
(1979) (footnote omitted).
4. Keck v. Jackson, 122 Ariz. 114, 593 P.2d 668 (1979); Towns v. Anderson, 195 Colo.
517, 579 P.2d 1163 (1978); Hatfield v. Max Rouse & Sons Northwest, 100 Idaho 840, 606
P.2d 944 (1980); Toms v. McConnell, 45 Mich. App. 647, 207 N.W.2d 140 (Ct. App. 1973);
Sears, Roebuck & Co. v. Young, 384 So. 2d 69 (Miss. 1980); Hughes v. Moore, 214 Va. 27,
197 S.E.2d 214 (1973); see Savard v. Cody Chevrolet, Inc., 126 Vt. 405, 234 A.2d 656 (1967).
5. See McDonough v. Whalen, 365 Mass. 506, 516, 313 N.E.2d 435, 441-42 (1974)
(footnote omitted) (" 'great anguish of mind and embarassment'" insufficient as a matter of
law for recovery); Corso v. Merrill, 119 N.H. 647, 659, 406 A.2d 300, 308 (1979)(psychic
injuries must be "accompanied by objective physical symptoms"); D'Ambra v. United States,
114 R.I. 643, 657, 338 A.2d 524, 531 (1975) (emotional harm must be "accompanied by
physical symptoms"); Chisum v. Behrens, 283 N.W.2d 235, 240 (S.D. 1979) (" 'accompanying physical injury'" required); Hunsley v. Giard, 87 Wash. 2d 424, 436, 553 P.2d 1096, 1103
(1976) (emotional harm must be "manifested by objective symptomatology").
6.

RESTATEMENT

(SECOND)

OF TORTS § 436A.(1965):

Negligence Resulting in Emotional Disturbance Alone.
If the actor's conduct is negligent as creating an unreasonable risk of causing either bodily
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this requirement. The rule has been directly considered and discarded only a few times in the last decade.7 Most recently, the California Supreme Court discarded the requirement of ensuing physical
injury in Molien v. Kaiser FoundationHospitals.8 That decision will
likely be studied by courts confronted with the issue in the future.
Elimination of the ensuing physical injury rule recognizes the
legally protected right to the enjoyment of emotional tranquility.9
For many years such a right has not been recognized in cases not
closely linked to physical occurrences. Liability has been limited by
various rules requiring some physical connection to the suffered emotional harm in order for liability to be imposed.10 The main reason
that these rules were originally employed and persisted for so long
was the fear that without them the courts would be inundated with a
flood of trivial and fraudulent suits.11 Most of the rules have been
discarded. 2
While they existed there was no need to delimit the right to
emotional tranquility because the more difficult cases that might
have prompted a definition of that right were excluded at the threshold. Only in exceptional cases was the right to emotional tranquility
recognized as a legally protected interest without any physical connection. 3 With the abandonment of the ensuing physical injury rule,
courts will be forced to face more squarely the question the rules
allowed them to avoid: What is the extent of the duty to avoid the
negligent infliction of emotional harm that is unconnected to physical injuries or events?
This note proposes factors to be considered in evaluating the
validity of claims for the negligent infliction of emotional harm. The
harm or emotional disturbance to another, and it results in such emotional disturbance alone,
without bodily harm or other compensable damage, the actor is not liable for such emotional
disturbance.

7.

Molien v. Kaiser Foundation Hosp., 27 Cal. 3d 916, 616 P.2d 813, 167 Cal. Rptr. 831

(1980); Montinieri v. Southern New England Tel. Co., 175 Conn. 337, 398 A.2d 1180 (1978);

Rodrigues v. State, 52 Hawaii 156, 472 P.2d 509 (1970); see Wallace v. Coca-Cola Bottling
Plants, Inc., 269 A.2d 117 (Me. 1970); Ferrara v. Galluchio, 5 N.Y.2d 16, 152 N.E.2d 249,

176 N.Y.S.2d 996 (1958). The requirement of ensuing physical injury has also been discarded
in a case of bystander recovery where other requirements have been met. Portee v. Jaffee, 84
N.J. 88, 417 A.2d 521 (1980).

8. 27 Cal. 3d 916, 616 P.2d 813, 167 Cal. Rptr. 831 (1980).
9.

See Rodrigues v. State, 52 Hawaii 156, 472 P.2d 509 (1970).

10. The two most prominent of these are the "impact rule" and the "zone of danger
rule." See text accompanying notes 31-33 infra.

11. See notes 18-20 infra and accompanying text.
12. See authority cited notes 31-33 infra and accompanying text.
13.

Johnson v. State, 37 N.Y.2d 378, 334 N.E.2d 590, 372 N.Y.S.2d 638 (1975).
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factors recognize the expansion of the duty but confine it in a way
that is both responsive to judicial apprehension of allowing recovery
for emotional harm and consistent with traditional negligence principles. The factors are intended to apply to claims for emotional harm
where no physical injury occurred and no risk of physical injury was
created.
The three factors proposed to evaluate the authenticity of a
claim for emotional harm are 1) the degree to which the plaintiffdefendant relationship is emotionally sensitive; 2) the degree to
which the defendant's activity threatens a commonly accepted emotional concern; 3) the degree to which the defendant's conduct departs from accepted standards of behavior. The factors are not intended to apply to cases where defendant creates a risk that physical
injury will occur, 14 but only to cases where emotional harm is
threatened.
Part One reviews the evolution of liability for emotional harms
both connected and unconnected to physical injury. Part Two first
considers the practical and policy problems inherent in the ensuing
physical injury rule, then presents and analyzes the Molien court's
rejection of and replacement for the rule. Part Three proposes a set
of factors to be applied to claims for the negligent infliction of emotional harm with no ensuing physical injury and attempts to answer
some of the questions presented by the recognition of such liability.
Part Four analyzes two recent cases in terms of the proposed factors.
BACKGROUND: THE SLOW GROWTH OF THE RIGHT TO
EMOTIONAL TRANQUILITY

From its beginnings, negligence law has been concerned primarily with physical injury. 15 Compared to emotional harm, physical
injury is fairly easy to prove: Simple observation by nonexperts will
often suffice to establish the existence of physical injury, and the
factfinder will often understand its cause from common experience.1 "
14. Such cases are more properly dealt with by already established tort doctrines. See
discussion in note 110 infra.
15. See, e.g., Brown v. Kendall, 60 Mass. 392 (1850); Weaver v. Ward, 134 Hobart 179,
80 Eng. Rep. 284 (K.B. 1616); W. PROSSER, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF TORTS § 28 (4th ed.
1971); Green, Foreseeability in Negligence Law, 61 COLUM. L. REV. 1401, 1417 (1961)
("[n]egligence law is designed primarily to protect people against physical hurts to person and
property unintentionally inflicted by the dangerous activities of other people").
16. Cf. W. PROSSER, supra note 15, § 32, at 158-59 (defendant can be held to base level
of knowledge about physical events and their attendant risks). Presumably the jury understands these physical relationships also.
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Although problems of causation and proximate causation can be vexing, they are much less so in cases of physical injury than in cases of

emotional harm.1" The main inquiry is usually whether the conduct
of the defendant causing the injury was unreasonable.

Establishing the existence and causation of emotional harm can
present more difficult questions. Self-perceived incompetence traditionally inhibited courts fom delving into the amorphous world of
emotional harms and led them to confine their activities and judgments to cases concerning physical harms. Compensation of those
who sustained harm due to another's negligence was, when the harm
was non-physical, frustrated by the "administrative factor"--a judicial hesitation to "enter upon a course of dealing which it cannot
finish, or that may bring down upon it an increase in business or a
mass of problems which it is not prepared to handle." 19 Judicial
17. This is not meant to imply that proof of causation of physical, injury is a simple
matter, but merely to point out that the inquiry involves readily understandable physical laws
and relationships as compared to the inquiry undertaken to assess causation of emotional
harm.
18. Green, The Duty Problem in Negligence Cases, 28 COLUM. L. REV. 1014, 1035-45
(1928).
19. Id. at 1035. The concerns of courts militating against allowing recovery for emotional harm have been much discussed and criticized. See, e.g., NEW YORK LAW REVISION
COMMISSION, LIABILITY FOR INJURIES RESULTING FROM FRIGHT OR SHOCK 375-454 (1936);
Magruder, Mental and Emotional Disturbancein the Law of Torts, 49 HARV. L. REV. 1033
(1936); Smith, Relation of Emotions to Injury and Diseases: Legal Liability for Psychic
Stimuli, 30 VA. L. REv. 193, 193-212 (1944); Throckmorton, Damagesfor Fright, 34 HARV.

L.

REV.

260 (1921).

These concerns can be generally summarized into five categories: 1) Concern that the
volume of litigation will increase drastically (the floodgates concern); 2) Concern that fraudulent claims will be successful (the integrity concern); 3) Concern that emotional harm damages are too remote, too speculative, too trivial to deserve legal redress; 4) Lack of precedent
for allowing such claims; 5) Concern that defendants will be subjected to unlimited liability.
As Dean Prosser has observed, however: "It is now more or less generally conceded that
the only valid objection against recovery for mental injury is the danger of vexatious suits and
fictitious claims, which has loomed very large in the opinions as an obstacle. The danger is a
real one, and must be met." W. PROSSER, supra note 15, § 54, at 328 (footnotes omitted).
Prosser concludes: "The very clear tendency of the recent cases is to refuse to admit incompetence to deal with such a problem, and to find some basis for redress in a proper case." Id. An
example of this admission of perceived incompetence can be found in one of the much noted
early cases imposing the "impact rule" that refused recovery to a plaintiff unless the defendant's negligence resulted in physical contact with the plaintiff:
A physical injury may be directly traceable to fright, and so may be caused by it.
We cannot say, therefore, that such consequences may not flow proximately from
unintentional negligence; and, if compensation in damages may be recovered for a
physical injury so caused, it is hard, on principle, to say why there should not also
be a recovery for the mere mental suffering when not accompanied by any perceptible physical effects. It would seem, therefore, that the real reason for refusing damages sustained from mere fright must be something different, and it probably rests
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noninterventionism was bolstered further by the still current belief
that for many minor emotional disturbances there are more appropriate instruments of social control than the law.2 °
Against this background it is understandable that the growth of
compensation for emotional harm has taken place gradually and has
proceeded most rapidly in cases closely connected to physical occurrences. 2 ' In such cases courts are experienced and consequently feel
competent. In limiting liability for unintentional infliction of emotional harm, the ensuing physical injury rule is the least challenged
survivor of a group of rules requiring some connection to a physical
injury or event. These rules bar recovery of damages for emotional
harm unless (1) plaintiff can successfully prove a cause of action
distinct from his or her claim for emotional harm (the parasitic damages rule) ;22 (2) plaintiff was physically touched as a result of defendant's negligence (the impact rule);23 or (3) plaintiff reasonably
feared that he or she would be physically hurt by defendant's conduct (the zone of danger rule).2
ParasiticEmotional Harm Recoveries
Damages for emotional harm caused by negligence were first
recoverable in actions for physical injury in the form of "pain and
suffering" damages.25 Such damages, still important in any physical
injury suit, are described as parasitic on the "host" cause of action.2 6
on the ground that in practice it is impossible satisfactorily to administer any other
rule.
Spade v. Lynn & B.R. Co., 168 Mass. 285, 288, 47 N.E. 88, 89 (1897).
20. See Magruder, supra note 19, at 1035:
Quite apart from the question how far peace of mind is a good thing in itself, it
would be quixotic indeed for the law to attempt a general securing of it. Against a
large part of the frictions and irritations and clashing of temperaments incident to
participation in a community life, a certain toughening of the mental hide is a better
protection than the law could ever be.
21. See, e.g., Dillon v. Legg, 68 Cal. 2d 728, 441 P.2d 912, 69 Cal. Rptr. 72 (1968).
22. See text accompanying notes 25-30 infra.
23. See text accompanying notes 32-33 infra.
24. See text accompanying notes 33-34 infra.
25.

W. PROSSER, supra note 15, § 54, at 330; 1 T. STREET, THE FOUNDATIONS OF LE-

GAL LIABILITY 460-75 (1906). Note Street's prophetic comment:
The treatment of any element of damage as a parasitic factor belongs essentially to a transitory stage of legal evolution. A factor which is to-day recognized as
parasitic will, forsooth, to-morrow be recognized as an independent basis of liability.
It is merely a question of social, economic, and industrial needs as those needs are
reflected in the organic law.
Id. at 470.
26. See Rodrigues v. State, 52 Hawaii 156, 472 P.2d 509 (1970); W. PROSSER, supra
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Without the primary cause of action there is no recovery for pain
and suffering.
Allowing such recovery does not threaten the administration of
27
negligence claims because it increases neither the number of suits
nor the ability of dishonest plaintiffs to sustain fraudulent claims. 28
No unique competence problems are presented by parasitic emotional harm recovery because the court need not address issues such
as the foreseeability or causation of emotional harm. Liability depends only upon a finding of an unreasonable risk of physical injury.
The primary problem presented-proof and valuation of pain and
suffering-is outweighed by the desire to compensate a plaintiff who
has suffered provable physical injury. 9
The boundaries of duty are not expanded by recovery for emotional harm as a parasitic item of damages, since the basis of liability remains defendant's creation of an unreasonable risk of physical
injury. Actors have no duty to avoid unreasonable risks of inflicting
emotional harm, except insofar as the physical injury they inflict
leads to emotional harm. Once emotional harm results from a negligently inflicted physical injury, defendant's liability is absolute, and
no showing of due care to avoid emotional harm can negate it.30 Defendant's liability depends solely on the creation of an unreasonable
risk of physical injury.
The Impact Rule and the Zone of Danger Rule
The next step in the allowance of damages for the negligent infliction of emotional harm is represented by the impact rule, which
permits recovery in cases involving negligent contact with the plaintiff, regardless of whether the contact causes physical injury.31 This
note 15, § 54, at 330; RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 47, Comment b (1965).
27. However, allowing recovery for emotional harm does increase the general level of
recovery in a personal injury action by engrafting "pain and suffering" onto physical damages.

Thus, it might be expected that a certain number of actions involving relatively minor physical
injury might be brought which would previously have been uneconomical.

28.

Admittedly, plaintiffs who in fact have suffered no "pain and suffering" may be able

to recover if they can convince the jury that they have, but no plaintiffs could ever recover

such damages unless they had already suffered physical injury. Thus, the integrity of the judicial system is not seriously threatened, for no plaintiff who has not suffered any harm would be
able to recover "pain and suffering" damages.

29. See, e.g., Morse v. Auburn & S.R.R., 10 Barb. 621 (N.Y. App. Div. 1851).
30. See W. PROSSER, supra note 15, § 43, at 261-63; RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS
§ 905 (1965).
31.

See, e.g., Spade v. Lynn & B.R. Co., 168 Mass. 285, 47 N.E. 88 (1897) (overruled

in Dziokonski v. Babineau, 375 Mass. 555, 380 N.E.2d 1295 (1978)); Mitchell v. Rochester
Ry., 151 N.Y. 107, 45 N.E. 354 (1896) (overruled in Battalla v. State, 10 N.Y.2d 237, 176
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rule has been generally rejected3 2 and has given way to the zone of
danger rule, under which a plaintiff may recover for emotional harm
even without impact-where he or she was close enough to a physical accident to have been put in actual physical danger and where
his or her emotional harm was caused by fear of that physical
danger.33
Neither the impact rule nor the zone of danger rule entails a
duty to avoid inflicting emotional distress unconnected to physical
events. The first requires physical contact, and the second requires a
reasonable fear of physical contact. Neither rule truly protects emotional tranquility, for both fail to compensate invasions of emotional
tranquility unconnected to physical events.
The Dillon Doctrine
The move from the impact rule to the zone of danger rule implies increased recognition of a legally protected right that can be
abridged other than by physical invasion. Such recognition is incomplete, however, because emotional harm not caused by fear of physical impact remains unprotected. This gap is theoretically untenable,
because emotional harm may result from causes other than fear of
physical impact.3 ' Indeed, witnessing a gruesome event may be even
more likely to cause emotional harm than fear of physical impact.
This inherently false distinction between emotional harm caused by
fear of physical injury and all other emotional harm was brought to
the fore in the case of Dillon v. Legg.3 5 A mother standing outside
the zone of danger witnessed her child run over and killed by an
N.E.2d 729, 219 N.Y.S.2d 34 (1961)).
32. E.g., Dziokonski v. Babineau, 375 Mass. 555, 380 N.E.2d 1295 (1978); Battalla v.
State, 10 N.Y.2d 237, 176 N.E. 2d 729, 219 N.Y.S.2d 34 (1961); Niederman v. Brodsky, 436
Pa. 401, 261 A.2d 84 (1970).

33. That is, plaintiff must reasonably fear harmful impact. E.g., Niederman v. Brodsky,
436 Pa. 401, 261 A.2d 84 (1970); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTs § 313(2)(1965); Annot.,

29 A.L.R.3d 1337 (1970).
34. See, e.g., Dziokonski v. Babineau, 375 Mass. 555, 564, 380 N.E.2d 1295, 1300
(1978):
The problem with the zone of danger rule. . . is that it is an inadequate measure of
the reasonable foreseeability of the possibility of physical injury resulting from a

parent's anxiety arising from harm to his child. The reasonable foreseeability of
such a physical injury to a parent does not turn on whether that parent was or was

not a reasonable prospect for a contemporaneous injury because of the defendant's
negligent conduct. Although the zone of danger rule tends to produce more reason-

able results than the [impact] rule and provides a means of limiting the scope of a
defendant's liability, it lacks strong logical support.
35.

68 Cal. 2d 728, 441 P.2d 912, 69 Cal. Rptr. 72 (1968).
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automobile. Under the zone of danger rule, a sibling within the zone
of danger-but not the mother-would be able to recover for emotional harm. Recognizing the anomaly of such a result, the California Supreme Court rejected the zone of danger rule, concentrating
instead on the degree of foreseeability that emotional harm might be
a result of the plaintiff's witnessing an injury caused by the driver's
negligence.3 6 In such an inquiry, whether plaintiff reasonably feared
for her own safety becomes irrelevant. The Dillon court held that a
duty to use reasonable care to avoid emotional harm arises where it
is reasonably foreseeable that emotional harm might occur whether
through fearing physical injury to oneself or by observing physical
injury to a loved one. 7
The Dillon doctrine advances the law significantly beyond requiring a physical connection to plaintiff's emotional harm, but even
that court retained some vestiges of a physical connection requirement. First, it held there is no liability for emotional harm unless a
primary consequence of defendant's negligence is physical injury,
whether to the plaintiff or to a third party.3 8 Second, Dillon confined
its holding to cases in which plaintiff suffered some physical injury
as a result of emotional distress.3 Other states adopting Dillon have
similarly confined the doctrine.4
While liability is vastly increased under the Dillon doctrine,
duty remains wed to the twin requirements that some physical injury
be suffered as a result of emotional harm and that the emotional
harm result from observing a physical injury. Thus, even after Dillon
it cannot be said that emotional tranquility is a truly protected
36.
37.
38.

Id. at 741, 441 P.2d at 920-21, 69 Cal. Rptr. at 80-81.
Id. at 739-40, 441 P.2d at 919-20, 69 Cal. Rptr. at 79-80.
Id. at 733, 441 P.2d at 916, 69 Cal. Rptr. at 76. The court stated:

In the absence of the primary liability of the tortfeasor for the death of the child, we
see no ground for an independent and secondary liability for claims for injuries by

third parties. The basis for such claims must be adjudicated liability and fault of
defendant; that liability and fault must be the foundation for the tortfeasor's duty of

due care to third parties who, as a consequence of such negligence, sustain emotional trauma. Id.
39. Id. at 740, 441 P.2d at 920, 69 Cal. Rptr. at 80.
40. Aragon v. Speelman, 83 N.M. 285, 491 P.2d 173 (1971); see Corso v. Merrill, 119
N.H. 647, 406 A.2d 300 (1979); D'Ambra v. United States, 114 R.I. 643, 338 A.2d 524
(1975); Landreth v. Reed, 570 S.W.2d 486 (Tex. Civ. App. 1978); cf Toms v. McConnell, 45
Mich. App. 647, 207 N.W.2d 140 (Ct. App. 1973) (emotional harm must result in definite

and objective physical injury, but that result can be indicated by withdrawal, depression, and
inability to function). Contra, Leong v. Takasaki, 55 Hawaii 398, 520 P.2d 758 (1974); but
see Portee v. Jaffee, 84 N.J. 88, 417 A.2d 521 (1980); Sinn v. Burd, 486 Pa. 146, 404 A.2d
672 (1979).
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interest.
Exceptions to the Physical Connection Requirement
Apart from the rules that emerged from cases involving the bystander or near-miss scenarios,41 certain other situations have
prompted courts to impose a duty to avoid negligent infliction of
emotional harm independent of any physical connection, either prior
or subsequent. These cases, which allowed recovery for emotional
harm without physical injury, consist of two types of occurrences. In
one, the defendant negligently mishandles a message informing
plaintiff that a loved one has died; 42 in the other, the defendant negligently mishandles the remains of a plaintiff's deceased loved one.43
These cases recognize that where a carelessly committed act is likely
to cause emotional harm, the actor must use ordinary care to guard
against that possibility. In such instances, whether plaintiff suffers
ensuing physical injury is irrelevant to the question of whether he or
she has in fact suffered emotional harm. As Prosser put it, the "especial likelihood of genuine and serious mental distress arising from
the special circumstances, .

serves as a guarantee that the claim

is not spurious."4
The only remaining area in which courts have been willing to
impose liability for emotional harm without requiring some physical
injury or event involves cases of intentional infliction . 5 The emo41. See text accompanying notes 31-40 supra.
42. E.g., Russ v. Western Union Tel. Co., 222 N.C. 504, 23 S.E.2d 681 (1943). Contra,
Corcoran v. Postal Tel.-Cable Co., 80 Wash. 570, 142 P. 29 (1914).
43. Brown Funeral Homes & Ins. Co. v. Baughn, 226 Ala. 661, 148 So. 154 (1933);
Allen v. Jones, 104 Cal. App. 3d 207, 163 Cal. Rptr. 445 (Ct. App. 1980); Carey v. Lima,
Salmon & Tully Mortuary, 168 Cal. App. 2d 42, 335 P.2d 181 (Ct. App. 1959); Blanchard v.
Brawley, 75 So.2d 891 (La. Ct. App. 1954); Lott v. State, 32 Misc.2d 296, 225 N.Y.S.2d 434
(Ct. Cl. 1962). But see Clemm v. Atchison T. & S.F. Ry., 126 Kan. 181, 268 P. 103 (1928).
For an entertaining case allowing tort recovery for mental anguish suffered as a result of
negligent misplacing of a pet dog's body so as to disrupt a planned funeral ceremony, see
Corso v. Crawford Dog and Cat Hosp., Inc., 97 Misc.2d 530, 415 N.Y.S.2d 182 (Civ. Ct.
N.Y. 1979) (holding that a pet dog "occupies a special place somewhere in between a person
and a piece of personal property," but cautioning that a "pet rock" does not).
44. W. PROSSER, supra note 15, § 54, at 330. The major reason that such cases did not
prompt invocation of the "administrative factor" is probably that their occurrence was thought
to be so infrequent as to avoid the threat of a flood of litigation. See notes 18-19 supra.
45. E.g., Alcorn v. Anbro Eng'r, Inc., 2 Cal. 3d 493, 468 P.2d 216, 86 Cal. Rptr. 88
(1970); Barnett v. Collection Serv. Co., 214 Iowa 1303, 242 N.W. 25 (1932); Agis v. Howard
Johnson Co., 371 Mass. 140, 355 N.E.2d 315 (1976); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS
§ 46, Comment k (1965). Contra, Perdue v, J.C. Penney Co., Inc., 470 F. Supp. 1234
(S.D.N.Y. 1979) (applying Texas law).
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tional harm in such cases must be severe,"6 and the conduct must not
only have been intended to cause it 7 but must also have been extreme and outrageous. 8 Such a limited cause of action poses little
threat to the efficiency or integrity of the judicial system, because
not many false claims are likely to be won. There are few things
harder to prove than intent. Even if a plaintiff falsely convinces a
jury that severe emotional harm has been suffered, the defendant
forced to pay such a judgment is not totally blameless. 49 Thus, a
miscarriage of justice is not nearly so objectionable as it would be if
the defendant were merely negligent.
PRACTICAL AND POLICY PROBLEMS OF THE ENSUING PHYSICAL

INJURY RULE

The ensuing physical injury rule is inconsistent with recognizing
emotional tranquility as a legally protected interest because physical
injury does not necessarily accompany emotional harm. 0 Disallowing recovery where there is no ensuing physical injury unjustifiably
eliminates a whole class of harm from the law's protection. The inconsistent application of the rule, moreover, testifies to its arbitrariness: Ensuing physical injury is required neither in certain negligence cases 1 nor in most intentional cases.5
Though arbitrary, the rule might be justified as a rule of administration if it effectively excluded fraudulent or trivial claims. The
ensuing physical injury rule, however, is vague53 and easy to circum-,
vent5" and thus fails to meet even that minimal requirement of an
46. E.g., Agis v. Howard Johnson Co., 371 Mass. 140, 355 N.E.2d 315 (1976); REOF ToRTs § 46, Comment j (1965).
47. E.g., Agis v. Howard Johnson Co., 371 Mass. 140, 355 N.E. 2d 315 (1976); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 46, Comment i (1965). Note that the intent is the intent
that severe emotional harm will result. It may possibly be met by disregard of a high
probability that emotional distress will occur. See Blakeley v. Estate of Shortal, 236 Iowa 787,
20 N.W.2d 28 (1945); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 46, Comment i (1965).
48. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 46 (1965).
49. Not only must his conduct be intentional but it must "go beyond all bounds of decency [so as] to be regarded as atrocious, and utterly intolerable in a civilized community."
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 46, Comment d (1965).
50. See Leong v. Takasaki, 55 Hawaii 398, 411-12, 520 P.2d 758, 766-67 (1974); Comment, Negligently Inflicted Mental Distress: The Case for an Independent Tort, 59 GEo. L.
REV. 1237, 1248-51 (1971).
51. See authority cited notes 42-44 supra.
52. See authority cited note 45 supra.
53. See discussion in note 3 supra.
54. See generally Molien v. Kaiser Foundation Hosp., 27 Cal. 3d 916, 616 P.Zd 813,
167 Cal. Rptr. 831 (1980).
STATEMENT (SECOND)
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administrative rule. Ironically, applying the rule leads to results directly contrary to its purpose: Only unscrupulous plaintiffs willing to
fabricate physical symptoms stand any chance of recovery; compensation is effectively denied only to the honest.
Judicial dissatisfaction with the rule may be inferred from a line
of cases finding the requirement satisfied by a decreasing severity of
physical injury. Withdrawal from society, for example, combined
with inability to function normally and continued depression, has
been found to satisfy the requirement of a definite physical injury. 56
Such dilution reminds one of earlier courts' strained efforts to find
an "impact" under the impact rule before it was generally
discarded.58
Some forthright courts have simply overruled the ensuing physical injury rule.07 Others appear ready to do the same.58 The illogic of
the rule and its ineffectiveness as an administrative device have produced a trend suggesting that it may be increasingly rejected by
courts presented with the question in the future.
Molien v. Kaiser Foundation Hospitals5"
Mr. Molien brought a negligence action against a doctor and
hospital for mental distress allegedly suffered as a result of a "negligently erroneous diagnosis" of syphilis in his wife.60 Upon being told
that she had syphilis, Mrs. Molien became suspicious that her hus55. Toms v. McConnell, 45 Mich. App. 647, 657, 207 N.W.2d 140, 145 (Ct. App.
1973).
56. E.g., Kenney v. Wong Len, 81 N.H. 427, 128 A.343 (1925) (mouse hair in stew
touched plaintiff's mouth); Morton v. Stack, 122 Ohio St. 115, 170 N.E. 869 (1930)(plaintiff
inhaled smoke). Kentucky, which still retains the impact rule, has even gone so far as to hold
that x-rays are sufficient physical contact to satisfy the rule. Deutsch v. Shein, 597 S.W.2d 141
(Ky. 1980).
57. Molien v. Kaiser Foundation Hosp., 27 Cal. 3d 916, 616 P.2d 813, 167 Cal. Rptr.
831 (1980); Rodrigues v. State, 52 Hawaii 156, 472 P.2d 509 (1970); see Wallace v. CocaCola Bottling Plants, Inc., 269 A.2d 117 (Me. 1970).
58. See Vance v. Vance, 286 Md. 490, 408 A.2d 728 (1979); Dziokonski v. Babineau,
375 Mass. 555, 560 n.6, 380 N.E.2d 1295, 1298 n.6 (1978); Sinn v. Burd, 486 Pa. 146, 404
A,2d 672 (1979) (court clearly announced intent to discard ensuing physical injury rule, id. at
160, 404 A.2d at 679, but statement is apparently dictum because complaint at issue was one
for mental andphysical injuries, id. at 149, 404 A.2d at 673); Hunsley v. Giard, 87 Wash. 2d
424, 553 P.2d 1096 (1976).
59. 27 Cal. 3d 916, 616 P.2d 813, 167 Cal. Rptr. 831 (1980).
60. 27 Cal. 3d at 920, 616 P.2d at 814, 167 Cal. Rptr. at 832. Mr. Molien also stated a
cause of action for loss of consortium that was upheld in the same case. Since that cause of
action is only tangentially related to the issue of the ensuing physical injury rule, this note
confines analysis to that part of the opinion that deals with the cause of action for the negligent infliction of emotional harm.
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band had been engaging in extramarital sex. Her suspicion and hostility towards Mr. Molien led to the destruction of their marriage.
Mr. Molien did not allege any physical injury but claimed that the
negligent misdiagnosis had caused him severe emotional distress and
loss of consortium. 1
The trial court sustained defendant's demurrer, and the Court
of Appeal affirmed the decision on two grounds. 62 First, Mr.
Molien's emotional harm was held "unforeseeable" because it failed
to satisfy the foreseeability criteria set out in Dillon v. Legg. 3 Second, his complaint was held insufficient for failure to allege ensuing
physical injury.6 '
The California Supreme Court reversed on both grounds.6 5 As
to foreseeability of mental distress, the court found the Dillon factors inapplicable to a case not involving a bystander's mental distress 6 and applied instead only Dillon's "general principle of foreseeability. ' ' 67 Because marital discord is a predictable result of an
erroneous syphilis diagnosis, and because the defendant knew Mrs.
Molien was married, the risk of harm to Mr. Molien was held "reasonably foreseeable."6 8 Consequently, the court held, the defendant
owed him a duty of care in diagnosing his wife's condition.69
The court next turned to the issue of whether a claim can be
stated for negligent infliction of emotional harm not resulting in
physical injury.70 The court assessed the rule requiring physical injury contemporaneous with or as a consequence of emotional harm
61. Id., 616 P.2d at 814-15, 167 Cal. Rptr. at 832-33.
62. Molien v. Kaiser Foundation Hosp., 158 Cal. Rptr. 107 (Ct. App. 1979), rev'd., 27
Cal. 3d 916, 616 P.2d 813, 167 Cal. Rptr. 831 (1980).
63. 68 Cal. 2d 728, 69 Cal. Rptr. 72, 441 P.2d 912 (1968). The Dillon court stated that
three factors must be considered when determining whether emotional harm is reasonably

foreseeable. The California Court of Appeal summarized them in Molien as follows:
whether the plaintiff and victim were closely related; whether the plaintiff was pre-

sent at the scene of the accident; and whether the shock resulted from a direct
emotional impact upon plaintiff from the sensory and contemporaneous observance
of the accident, as contrasted with hearing of the accident from others, after its
occurrence.
158 Cal. Rptr. at 110-11 (citing Dillon v. Legg, 68 Cal.2d 728, 740-41, 69 Cal. Rptr. 72, 80,
441 P.2d 912, 920 (1968)).
64. 158 Cal. Rptr. at I10.

65.

27 Cal. 3d at 923, 930, 616 P.2d at 817, 821, 167 Cal. Rptr. at 835, 839.

66.

Id. at 922-23, 616 P.2d at 816-17, 167 Cal. Rptr. at 834-35.

67. Id. at 923, 616 P.2d at 816, 167 Cal. Rptr. at 834.
68.

Id., 616 P.2d at 817, 167 Cal. Rptr. at 835.

69. Id.
70.

Id. at 927, 616 P.2d at 819, 167 Cal. Rptr. at 837.
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from the perspective of the need to assure the validity of a claim. A
like function, it noted, is performed by requiring extreme and outrageous conduct to warrant recovery for emotional distress unaccompanied by physical injury where the defendant acts intentionally.717 2
The court then gave its reasons for discarding the "venerable"
rule requiring ensuing physical injury. First, it found the rule "both
overinclusive and underinclusive" as a means of detecting false
claims: On the one hand allowing recovery where even a trivial injury ensues, the rule on the other hand "mechanically denies court
access to claims that may well be valid.17 3 Second, the rule both
encourages exaggerated pleading and rewards ingenious quests for
some evidence of physical harm in order to satisfy the rule's technical requirement. 4 Third, the ensuing physical injury rule fails to address the issue of whether plaintiff has in fact suffered emotional
harm, a question properly determined by the jury.75
Hereafter, the court held, the screening function of the ensuing
physical injury rule would be served by requiring claims for emotional harm to possess "'some guarantee of genuineness in the circumstances of the case.' ,,76 Jurors should determine whether defendant's conduct caused emotional harm by "referring to their own
experience. '7 7 The emotional harm must be "serious" to be compensable.7 8 In reaching this result Molien implicitly raises a generalized
71. Id.
72. Id.
73. Id. at 928, 616 P.2d at 820, 167 Cal. Rptr. at 838.
74. Id. at 929, 616 P.2d at 820, 167 Cal. Rptr. at 838. Mr. Molien was given leave to
amend his complaint but declined to do so. Id. at 920, 616 P.2d at 815, 167 Cal. Rptr. at 833.
75. Id. at 929-30, 616 P.2d at 821, 167 Cal. Rptr. at 839.
76. Id. at 930, 616 P.2d at 821, 167 Cal. Rptr. at 839 (quoting Rodrigues v. State, 52
Hawaii 156, 172, 472 P.2d 509, 520 (1970)).
77. Id.
78. "'[S]erious mental distress may be found where a reasonable man, normally constituted, would be unable to adequately cope with the mental stress engendered by the circumstances of the case.'" Id. at 928, 616 P.2d at 819-20, 167 Cal. Rptr. at 837-38 (1980) (quoting Rodrigues v. State, 52 Hawaii 156, 173, 472 P.2d 509, 520 (1970)). The two dissenting
judges argued that the "standards" enunciated by the majority are meaningless and that
fraudulent claims are now much more possible than they were under the ensuing physical
injury rule. The attack focused on the majority's faith that the jury will be able to evaluate
claims for emotional harm by referring to their own experiences. The dissenters argued that
such an evaluation is inapposite in a case of negligence where the primary inquiry should be
into the existence of emotional harm and that that is a difficult medical question on which
jurors would be forced to speculate. Allowing jurors such latitude, the dissenters urged, is
improper in the case of a negligent tort as opposed to an intentional tort, because it would
create liability of defendants disproportionate to their culpability. The dissent also posited the
interesting possibility that this cause of action may subsume that of slander by allowing recov-
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duty to avoid creating risks of emotional harm even when it is unconnected to physical events simultaneous with or subsequent to
plaintiff's distress."9 A cause of action cannot be proved, however,
where there is no guarantee of genuineness in the circumstances of
the case. Thus, the important inquiry in determining liability is what
constitutes a guarantee of genuineness.
The Molien court did not clearly state where it found a guarantee of genuineness in the case before it. The nearest approximation is
its statement that "the negligent examination of Mrs. Molien and
the conduct flowing therefrom are objectively verifiable actions by
the defendants that foreseeably elicited serious emotional responses
in the plaintiff and hence serve as a measure of the validity of plaintiff's claim for emotional distress."80 Hence, the implication in
Molien is that the guarantee of genuineness is to be found in the
nature of the defendant's conduct, not in its effect on the plaintiff.
That is the same area examined by a court evaluating a claim for
the intentional infliction of emotional distress when it seeks a
validator of the cause of action."1 There is no indication, however,
that the defendant in Molien was anything more than negligent in
his actions. Thus, it is hard to conclude that the court found a guarantee of genuineness solely in the defendant's conduct, or, if it did,
what such a guarantee might be.
The Molien court could have found a guarantee of genuineness
in the eventual disintegration of the Moliens' marriage. It is sounder
to look toward plaintiff than toward defendant's conduct for a guarantee that the claim is not spurious, for harm may not necessarily
result even from extreme conduct. Additionally, such a conception of
a guarantee of genuineness provides a logical replacement for the
ensuing physical injury rule, which attempted to insure that plaintiff
had in fact been emotionally harmed. 2 It seems unlikely, however,
ery without proof of all the elements of that cause of action by merely proving negligent disturbance of emotional tranquility. Id. at 933-37, 616 P.2d at 823-26, 167 Cal. Rptr. at 841-43

(Clark, J., dissenting).
79. The court could have fashioned another "exception" for "public policy" reasons of
regulating the standard of the diagnostic industry. For an example of this type of jurisprudence, see Allen v. Jones, 104 Cal. App. 3d 207, 163 Cal. Rptr. 445 (Ct. App. 1980) (mortu-

ary industry).
80.

27 Cal. 3d at 930-31, 616 P.2d at 821, 167 Cal. Rptr. at 839. The court also ob-

served that "another corroborating factor" was that a false imputation of syphilis constitutes
slander per se by statute. Id. at 931, 616 P.2d at 821, 167 Cal. Rptr. at 839.
81.

See authority cited note 47 supra.

82. For a discussion of the ensuing physical injury rule, see text accompanying notes 5058 supra.
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that the Molien court intended to link the destruction of the marriage to the guarantee-of-genuineness standard, since doing so would
render superfluous the other requirement of the Molien rule-that
the plaintiff suffer "serious" mental distress. a
PROPOSED FACTORS

Once the ensuing physical injury rule is discarded, the possible
extent of new kinds of claims for negligent infliction of emotional
harm increases strikingly. Incorrect laboratory tests indicating cancer or pregnancy may create mental distress. An aspiring attorney
told that he has failed his bar examination 8 or a relative informed
that a certain airline flight has crashed killing all aboard85 may experience emotional distress. Even a funeral home owner may be severely upset when the telephone company lists his business under
"Frozen foods-Wholesale" in its yellow pages. 6 A new car buyer
who purchases a "lemon" may suffer mental harm. 87 So too may a

mother who is informed one day that her newborn infant has died,
then told the next day that the hospital is not sure whether the child
is alive, then kept in a state of uncertainty for three weeks. 8
Evaluating such claims is more difficult than evaluating physical
injury cases. Some kind of rational standard must be employed in
order to define the limits of liability. Few questions about the basis
or extent of liability for the negligent infliction of emotional harm
are answered by requiring merely a guarantee of genuineness as a
basis of compensability for emotional harm without ensuing physical
injury. That standard suggests merely that if a case has a "special
factual pattern," 89 plaintiff may properly recover. It says little about
the specific characteristics necessary for a case to qualify as a vali83, See discussion in note 78 supra.
84. This is suggested by the recent misnotification of bar applicants in New York. See
N.Y. Times, Dec. 3, 1980, at B3, col. 6.
85. This situation is suggested by an obiter dictum in Wood v. United Airlines, 404 F.2d
162, 166 (10th Cir. 1968).
86. A suit has been brought under those facts seeking, inter alia, $50,000 in damages
for "mental anguish." "Some guy even called and asked what meat was on special for the day
at the funeral home," the owner said. A Grave Mistake, Newsday, Oct. 10, 1980, at 7, col. 3.
87. This is roughly what happened in Lemaldi v. De Tomaso of Am., Inc., 156 N.J.
Super. 441, 383 A.2d 1220 (Super. Ct. Law Div. 1978), discussed at text accompanying notes
124-133 infra.
88. These are the abbreviated facts of Muniz v. United Hosps. Medical Center Presbyterian Hosp., 153 N.J. Super. 79, 379 A.2d 57 (Super. Ct. App. Div. 1977), discussed at text
accompanying notes 112-123 infra.
89. Rodrigues v. State, 52 Hawaii 156, 170, 472 P.2d 509, 519 (1970).
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dated claim. The idea of a guarantee of genuineness has in common
with the concept of duty the requirement that there be a fair
probability that harm will occur at the time the defendant acts. Reasonable foreseeability-a shorthand definition of dutyq---is judged
by determining what the defendant could reasonably have foreseen
at the time he or she acted. A guarantee of genuineness is judged by
determining what occurred and asking whether the harm was sufficiently likely to support a conclusion that it did in fact occur. Both
inquiries necessarily involve assessing the probability of emotional
harm. The duty inquiry asks whether harm was so probable at the
time the defendant acted that he or she should have exercised reasonable care; the guarantee-of-genuineness inquiry asks whether
what actually occurred probably caused emotional harm.
Because assessing suits for negligent infliction of emotional
harm often involves identical inquiries about the probability of emotional harm resulting from certain conduct, courts may be tempted
to collapse guarantee of genuineness into reasonable foreseeability.
The former standard, however (at least as employed by the Molien
court), is intended as a standard of proof for the jury,"1 whereas
reasonable foreseeability is intended as an element of the cause of
action. In practical terms, there may be little difference between the
two, for plaintiffs must still offer proof of a guarantee of genuineness. The only real difference is that the determination at trial
whether a guarantee exists is for the factfinder, while duty is determined by the judge as a matter of law. The guarantee-of-genuineness issue can still be decided on appeal as a matter of law.
Whether the judge or jury decides the issue, the guarantee-ofgenuineness standard provides inadequate guidance, especially since
such little content was given to the phrase by the Molien court.92
The term has been interpreted as "'an especial likelihood of genuine
and serious mental distress,' -93 and has been construed as requiring
that the plaintiff's reaction was "entirely plausible. 94 These expres90.

See generally Dillon v. Legg, 68 Cal. 2d 728, 740, 441 P.2d 912, 920, 69 Cal. Rptr.

72, 80 (1968).
91.

Molien v. Kaiser Foundation Hosp., 27 Cal. 3d 916, 930, 616 P.2d 813, 821, 167

Cal. Rptr. 831, 839 (1980). The court concluded: "To repeat: this is a matter of proof to be
presented to the trier of fact. The screening of claims on this basis at the pleading stage is a

usurpation of the jury's function." Id.; see W. PROSSER, supra note 15, § 54, at 328.
92.

See text accompanying notes 80-83 supra.

93. Johnson v. State, 37 N.Y.2d 378, 382, 334 N.E.2d 590, 592, 372 N.Y.S.2d 638, 642
(1975)(quoting W. PROSSER, supra note 15, § 54, at 330).
94.

Ferrara v. Galluchio, 5 N.Y.2d 16, 22, 152 N.E.2d 249, 253, 176 N.Y.S.2d 996,
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sions mean little more than that the particular court has been sufficiently impressed with all the evidence (and perhaps the demeanor of
parties)9 5 to allow the claim.
Beyond the narrow holdings of cases that have allowed recovery
for the negligent infliction of emotional harm without ensuing physical injury, several factual similarities suggest a set of factors that
should be considered in evaluating whether a case contains a guarantee of genuineness. Because these factors are indistinguishable from
the duty formulation of reasonable foreseeability, their discussion
necessarily involves considerations identical to those the judge will
assess to determine whether the case should even be given to the
jury.
One risk of enumerating factors to be considered in evaluating
negligence claims is that future courts may apply them too rigidly
and convert them into requirements.9" Such a fear may have restrained the Molien court from listing the considerations that should
determine whether a guarantee of genuineness exists. Though qualified by that caveat, these factors are offered as considerations that
may be helpful in guiding future decisions.
First, as is evident in many of the cases, a situation is ripe for
imposing liability for negligently inflicted emotional harm even in
the absence of ensuing physical injury where the defendant has
taken action directed at the plaintiff with full knowledge that any
error was likely to result in emotional upset.97 Often the defendant's
1000 (1958).
95. See Lemaldi v. De Tomaso of Am., Inc. 156 N.J. Super. 441, 445, 383 A.2d 1220,
1222 (Super. Ct. Law Div. 1978). There the court observed: "Plaintiff was a personable young
man. . . ." Id.
96. See Miller, The Scope of Liabilityfor Negligent Infliction of Emotional Distress:
Making "The Punishment Fit the Crime," 1 U. HAWAII L. REV. 1(1979): "[The three Dillon]

factors have tended to be converted into requirements of foreseeability, imposed with only
slight flexibility and used to deny recovery as a matter of law in cases where, under ordinary
negligence principles, a court could reasonably find that the risk of emotional shock to plaintiff
was reasonably foreseeable." Id. at 5 (footnote omitted) (emphasis in original).
97. Molien v. Kaiser Foundation Hosp., 27 Cal. 3d 916, 616 P.2d 813, 167 Cal. Rptr.
831 (1980) (diagnosis of syphilis of spouse); Johnson v. State, 37 N.Y.2d 378, 334 N.E.2d

590, 372 N.Y.S.2d 638 (1975) (notice that mother has died); Russ v. Western Union Tel. Co.,
222 N.C. 504, 23 S.E.2d 681 (1943) (notice that father died and that funeral would be next

day); cf. Muniz v. United Hosps. Medical Center Presbyterian Hosp., 153 N.J. Super. 79, 379
A.2d 57 (Super. Ct. App. Div. 1977) (treatment of remains of dead baby). But see Rodrigues

v. State, 52 Hawaii 156, 472 P.2d 509 (1970) (maintenance of water runoff system); Lemaldi
v. De Tomaso of Am., Inc., 156 N.J. Super. 441, 383 A.2d 1220 (Super. Ct. Law Div. 1978)
(repair of automobile); Ferrara v. Galluchio, 5 N.Y.2d 16, 152 N.E.2d 249, 176 N.Y.S.2d 996

(1958) (x-ray treatment for bursitis).
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action consists of conveying information that is virtually certain to
produce emotional distress. 98 The act of communicating is particularly likely to present as its sole risk a high probability of emotional
harm as compared with physical acts that may present dual risks.19
Communication is also conduct in which the defendant is likely to be
aware of the plaintiff's existence, thereby eliminating the problem
that the plaintiffs presence may have been unforeseeable.
Second, liability seems particularly appropriate where the plaintiff's concern or the object of plaintiff's emotional distress is one
commonly regarded as worthy of emotional attachment. The continued fidelity and the continued existence of a loved one are universal emotional keystones. 100 Cases where emotional harm recoveries
have been allowed without requiring ensuing physical injury also
generally involve widely shared emotional concerns. 01 This factor is
included in the calculus not to exclude claims involving disfavored
attachments or concerns, but to insure a high probability that the
plaintiff in fact suffered emotional harm. The more commonly accepted plaintiff's concern, the more likely the harm is genuine.
The third factor is the degree of disregard for the concerns of
others demonstrated by the defendant's actions, which may be so
98. E.g., Molien v. Kaiser Foundation Hosp., 27 Cal. 3d 916, 616 P.2d 813, 167 Cal.
Rptr. 831 (1980) (information that wife had syphilis); Johnson v. State, 37 N.Y.2d 378, 334
N.E.2d 590, 372 N.Y.S.2d 638 (1975) (information that mother was dead).
99. E.g., Dillon v. Legg, 68 Cal. 2d 728, 441 P.2d 912, 69 Cal. Rptr. 72 (1968) (driving
a car); Ferrara v. Galluchio, 5 N.Y.2d 16, 152 N.E.2d 249, 176 N.Y.S.2d 996 (1958) (applying x-rays).
100. See Portee v. Jaffee, 84 N.J. 88, 97, 417 A.2d 521, 526 (1980). In allowing a
mother bystander recovery for harm caused her by witnessing her son's death, the court
observed:
The task in the present case involves the refinement of principles of liability to
remedy violations of reasonable care while avoiding speculative results or punitive
liability. The solution is close scrutiny of the specific personal interests assertedly
injured. . . . The knowledge that loved ones are safe and whole is the deepest wellspring of emotional welfare. Against that reassuring background, the flashes of anxiety and disappointment that mar our lives take on softer hues.
Id.
101. Rodrigues v. State, 52 Hawaii 156, 472 P.2d 509 (1970) (concern over severe damage to home); Muniz v. United Hosps. Medical Center Presbyterian Hosp., 153 N.J. Super.
79, 379 A.2d 57 (Super. Ct. App. Div. 1977) (concern over whether newborn baby dead or
alive); Ferrara v. Galluchio, 5 N.Y.2d 16, 152 N.E.2d 249, 176 N.Y.S.2d 996 (1958) (concern
over the likelihood of having cancer); Lott v. State, 32 Misc. 2d 296, 225 N.Y.S.2d 434 (Ct.
Cl. 1962) (concern over dignified treatment of corpse of loved one consistent with religious
customs); Russ v. Western Union Tel. Co., 222 N.C. 504, 23 S.E.2d 681 (1943) (concern over
missing father's funeral). But see Lemaldi v. De Tomaso of Am., Inc., 156 N.J. Super. 441,
383 A.2d 1220 (Super. Ct. Law Div. 1978) (concern over extended difficulties with automobile
and inadequate repairs).
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careless that they transform a situation not otherwise emotionally
charged into one where emotional harm will foreseeably result.102
Such cases border on the separate tort of intentional infliction of
emotional distress by extreme and outrageous conduct,1 03 which encompasses reckless behavior. 0 4
These three factors, which assess whether the facts of a particular case possess a guarantee of genuineness, may be applied equally
to an analysis of whether a defendant was negligent in the first
place. That is, while the factors address the genuineness of plaintiff's
emotional harm, they also help determine whether defendant took an
unreasonable risk that such harm would be caused. Thus, in giving
any content to the guarantee-of-genuineness standard, one necessarily increases the standard of misconduct required to create liability.
In simplistic terms this might be reducible to a jury instruction that
reads: "In order to find for plaintiff you must find that defendant
knew or should have known that his actions were very likely to cause
emotional harm to plaintiff and that under the circumstances of the
case the action was unreasonable." Vague as such an instruction is,
it does indicate that defendant must be something more than negligent for liability to be imposed. Yet there is still no requirement that
defendant acted intentionally or recklessly.
It would be a mistake to treat the three factors as invariable
requirements of a guarantee of genuineness, 105 for there may be
other indicators that insure against fraudulent suits. Further, it
should be recognized that the three factors are interdependent. For
example, conduct will be considered increasingly extreme as the legitimacy of the plaintiff's emotional concern increases.10 At the very
least, the factors help guide the inquiry as to whether liability should
be imposed and thus serve to bring some predictability to claims for
the direct negligent infliction of emotional harm.
102.

See Muniz v. United Hosps. Medical Center Presbyterian Hosp., 153 N.J. Super.

79, 379 A.2d 57 (Super. Ct. App. Div. 1977); Rockhill v. Pollard, 259 Ore. 54, 485 P.2d 28
(1971).
103. See authority cited notes 45-48 supra.
104.

See authority cited note 47 supra.

105.

See authority cited note 96 supra.

106.

See, e.g., Muniz v. United Hosps. Medical Center Presbyterian Hosp., 153 N.J..

Super. 79, 379 A.2d 57 (Super. Ct. App. Div. 1977). Had the plaintiffs' concern in Muniz
been over something less weighty than the existence of their newborn baby, a three week delay

would not have seemed as severe or extreme.
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The Continued Sufficiency of Ensuing Physical Injury
The abandonment of the ensuing physical injury rule presents
an additional question: whether ensuing physical injury, though not
required to state a cause of action, should be sufficient in and of
itself to validate a claim for the negligent infliction of emotional
harm. The Molien decision seems to support an affirmative answer to
107
that question.
If ensuing physical injury continues to be sufficient to prosecute
a claim for the negligent infliction of emotional harm, unscrupulous
plaintiffs will be no less tempted than they were before to fabricate
physical injuries. In short, where it is questionable whether the circumstances of a case demonstrate a guarantee of genuineness, the
plaintiff would be well advised to plead and prove physical injury.
The continued sufficiency of ensuing physical injury would perpetuate two of the faults that the Molien court attempted to correct
by abandoning the rule. First, plaintiffs would still be able to recover
for emotional distress where they have suffered even trivial physical
harm. 0 a Second, unscrupulous plaintiffs would have just as much incentive to fabricate testimony 09 as they did under the ensuing physical injury rule. Even a middle ground approach-that ensuing physical injury is not itself sufficient to validate a claim but is one factor
to be considered in evaluating genuineness-would fail to resolve
these faults.
A more radical resolution of the question would treat the physical injury as parasitic on the cause of action for negligent infliction
of emotional harm. In that case proof of physical injury would be
relevant only to the extent of damages, not to liability itself. Such an
approach would distinguish the negligent infliction of emotional
harm from the negligent infliction of physical injury.110 It might also
help disengage this area of negligence law from physical connectors,
thus leaving courts free to focus on the difficult questions concerning
107.

See, Molien v. Kaiser Foundation Hosp., 27 Cal. 3d 916, 926-27, 616 P.2d 813,

819, 167 Cal. Rptr. 831, 837 (1980) (citations omitted): "Our courts have ...

devised various

means of compensating for the infliction of emotional distress, provided there is some assur-

ance of the validity of the claim. As we have seen, physical injury, whether it occurs contemporaneously with or is a consequence of emotional distress, provides one such guarantee."

108.

See generally id. at 928, 616 P.2d at 820, 167 Cal. Rptr. at 838.

109.
110.

Id.
An act likely to cause bodily harm through mental disturbance could still create

liability independent of the tort of negligent infliction of emotional harm, and proof of physical
injury would be sufficient to establish such a claim. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS
§ 306 & Comment b (1965).
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the foreseeability and the scope of liability for emotional harm.111
APPLYING THE FACTORS

Two recent New Jersey cases dramatically point up the difficulty that courts will have in determining liability in the absence of
content for the guarantee-of-genuineness standard.
Muniz v. United Hospitals Medical Center Presbyterian
Hospital"2
Mrs. Muniz's premature son was taken from her at birth and
transferred to the defendant hospital to be treated for respiratory
problems. Two days later, while Mrs. Muniz was still in the hospital,
she received a telephone call from an unidentified employee of the
defendant informing her that her son was dead. Mrs. Muniz became
hysterical and was given a sedative. Over the next three weeks, Mr.
and Mrs. Muniz attempted to ascertain whether their son was in fact
dead. For unknown reasons the hospital was unable to confirm or
deny the report or to locate the infant. Finally, it confirmed the
death and produced the body.113
The first part of the Muniz complaint alleged three negligent
acts: the manner of notification; the subsequent failure to confirm
the child's death or to make formal notification; and the misplacement of the child's body. 114 The second part of the complaint alleged
that defendant's conduct "constitute[d] outrageous conduct by
means of the gross and wanton negligence of the defendant as constituting an intentional infliction of mental and physical suffering to
both plaintiffs [sic]. '

15

The first count did not allege any ensuing

physical injury but specified "unrelenting emotional anguish, distress
and anxiety." 1 6 The Superior Court dismissed the complaint for
111
failure to state a claim because no physical injury was alleged.
After reviewing Dillon and its progeny, the court concluded that
"[n]one of them made a new kind of conduct tortious. They simply
I1l.For a good recent treatment of the problem of the scope of liability for the negligent infliction of emotional harm, see Miller, supra note 96.
112. 153 N.J. Super. 79, 379 A.2d 57 (Super Ct. App. Div. 1977), rev'g Muniz v.
United Hasps. Medical Center Presbyterian Hasp., 146 N.J. Super. 512, 370 A.2d 76 (Super.
Ct. Law Div. 1976).
113. 146 N.J. Super. at 514, 370 A.2d at 77.
114. Id. at 514-15, 370 A.2d at 77-78.
115, Id. at 515, 370 A.2d at 78.
116. Id.
117. Id. at 530, 370 A.2d at 86.
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expanded the scope of damages in universally recognized torts."11
The court then considered the "tort of 'outrage,'" concluding that
"[defendant's telephone call] is not actionable as 'outrage' for lack
of deliberateness. It is not actionable as negligence because no physical hurt or other compensable damage resulted."110 The court recognized that the facts of the case might make it fall into the dead body
or telegraph exceptions to the ensuing physical injury rule' 20 but declined to "broaden this area of tort law to sustain the complaint. 21
The Appellate Division reversed, holding that Mr. and Mrs.
Muniz ought to be allowed to amend their complaint and have discovery in order to try to state a claim. It offered, as possible but not
exclusive bases for a claim, "outrage" or the negligent mishandling
122
of a corpse.
The Muniz claim would be valid when evaluated under the proposed factors, since Mrs. Muniz probably did suffer serious mental
distress, even though she did not have any resulting physical injuries.
First, the hospital acted-and failed to act-with full awareness
both of the plaintiff's identity and of the emotionally sensitive nature
of the information that it first communicated and then failed to confirm. The communication, whether tortious or not, was of a type certain to cause Mr. and Mrs. Muniz some emotional suffering. Second,
Mr. and Mrs. Muniz's concern for their child falls within a class of
commonly legally protected rights.' 23 Third, the hospital's failure to
confirm or deny the child's death for three weeks could easily be
viewed as extreme conduct.
2
Lemaldi v. De Tomaso of America, Inc.1

4

Mr. Lemaldi bought a $12,000 imported sports car from the
defendant auto dealer. The steering pulled to the right the first day
that he drove it, and the car broke down totally after three weeks.
During the warranty period, the air conditioner fell out of the car
118. Id. at 518, 370 A.2d at 79.
119. Id. at 523, 370 A.2d at 82.
120. See notes 42-44 supra and accompanying text.
121. 146 N.J. Super. at 528-29, 370 A.2d at 85.
122. Muniz v. United Hosps. Medical Center Presbyterian Hosp., 153 N.J. Super. 79,
379 A.2d 57 (Super. Ct. App. Div. 1977).
123. W. PROSSER, supra note 15, § 54, at 334. "It seems sufficiently obvious that the
shock of a mother at danger or harm to her child may be both a real and a serious injury. All
ordinary human feelings are in favor of her action against the negligent defendant." Id. See
note 100 supra and accompanying text.
124. 156 N.J. Super. 441, 383 A.2d 1220 (Super. Ct. Law Div. 1978).
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into the street, and the car was plagued with numerous less serious
problems. The car required more than $4,000 in repairs after the
warranty period was over. Mr. Lemaldi experienced various unsatisfactory contacts with the defendant's employees. 125
The Lemaldi court relied on the Appellate Division's apparent
"willingness to conceive of claims for relief for emotional distress
arising out of deviation from a standard of care"1 26 to allow Mr.
Lemaldi a cause of action for his "mental anguish" suffered as a
result of defendant's apparent inattentiveness and unresponsiveness
to his complaints. The court denied defendant's contention that it
could not be liable unless Mr. Lemaldi showed that it had engaged
in "willful malicious conduct.11 27 The court also denied defendant a

judgment n.o.v. after the jury awarded plaintiff $8,000 for mental
anguish, but granted a new trial on the issue of damages because of
plaintiff's lack of adequate proof of his headaches. 28 The Lemaldi
court held that the jury could reasonably have found that the auto
dealer's inaction would "aggravate an ordinary man to the point of
'mental anguish' "129 and that the "unique circumstances of this case
afford sufficient guarantee that we are not dealing with a frivolous or
fraudulent claim."130 It apparently found that guarantee in the prolonged period during which the defects were not corrected and in the
relatively high cost of the auto and its repair. 131
The proposed factors would not validate Mr. Lemaldi's claim
for emotional harm. First, a relationship between a customer and a
car dealer is not normally emotionally charged, and the dealer's action or inaction would not normally lead to serious emotional harm.
Second, the object of Mr. Lemaldi's emotional harm-the state of
repair of his automobile-is clearly not commonly regarded as producing emotional attachment.13 2 The third factor probably is more

pronounced in the Lemaldi case than the other two, but the opinion
gives little indication of severe misconduct by the defendant auto
125.
126.
127.
128.
129.
130.
131.

Id. at 446-47, 383 A.2d at 1223.
Id. at 447-48, 383 A.2d at 1223.
Id. at 447, 383 A.2d at 1223.
Id. at 450, 383 A.2d at 1224-25.
Id. at 447, 383 A.2d at 1223.
Id. at 449, 383 A.2d at 1224.
The car cost $12,000 and the repair bill was $4,000. Id. at 446-47, 383 A.2d 1222-

23.
132. But see Portee v. Jaffee, 84 N.J. 88, 417 A.2d 521, 524 (1980) (citing Lemaldi v.
De Tomaso of Am., Inc., 156 N.J. Super. 441, 383 A.2d 1220 (Super. Ct. Law Div. 1978),
with approval).
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dealer.1 3 Perhaps the long period of time during which Mr. Lemaldi
was inconvenienced contributed to the severity of the defendant's
misconduct. At best the Lemaldi case would show only some evidence of meeting only one of the factors proposed to evaluate such
claims; thus it would probably not qualify for the imposition of
liability.
CONCLUSION

The emerging duty to avoid negligent inflictions of emotional
harm has a somewhat confused history. Linkages to physical injuries
and physical events have obscured the emergence of a legally protected interest in emotional tranquility. As more and more states
adopt the doctrine of Dillon v. Legg, the connection of emotional
harm liability to physical events tends to disappear. The last link to
break will be the requirement of ensuing physical injury.
The demise of the ensuing physical injury rule is a step forward
in recognizing emotional tranquility as a legally protected interest.
The expansion of litigation that is likely to occur in this area as a
result of the relaxation of the technical requirements of pleading will
force courts to consider more closely than ever before the basis of
liability for negligently inflicted harms. Judicial uneasiness with an
apparently boundless cause of action and the great variety of new
claims that will be presented for resolution has prompted the requirement that the facts of a case contain a guarantee of genuineness to validate the authenticity of a claim for negligently inflicted
emotional harm. Although the parameters of that validator have not
yet been clearly identified, cases allowing recovery for pure emotional harm unconnected to physical events or injuries suggest factors that should be taken into account in determining liability. Although these factors are intended primarily to be applied to the facts
of a case by juries as they seek to determine the probability of plain-tiff's having suffered serious emotional harm, they are also relevant
to the judge's inquiry into whether a duty should be recognized in
any given case. The factors are grounded on the principle that defendants should be held liable only for consequences which were reasonably foreseeable to them at the time they acted.
The first factor is the extent to which the plaintiff and the de133. Mr. Lemaldi had a "number of unsatisfactory contacts with various [defendant]
personnel" who responded "varyingly from open hostility to inattention." 156 N.J. Super. at
446-47, 383 A.2d at 1223.
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fendant were involved in a highly sensitive, emotionally charged
prior relationship. The second factor is the extent to which the arena
in which the defendant undertook to act is commonly regarded as
worthy of emotional attachments. The third factor is the extent to
which defendant's conduct represents an extreme departure from
normal standards of behavior. Applying these three factors to claims
for negligent infliction of emotional harm should assist in validating
such claims by supplying content for the guarantee-of-genuineness
standard.
Ethan Finneran
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